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 With the advent of advanced, highly automated cockpits that are found in 
modern jet transport category aircraft, most of the tedious work of flying the 
aircraft solely by reference to raw data information from the airplane’s 
instruments is becoming a thing of the past.  Pilots are no longer required to use 
their basic instrument skills on a daily basis and as a result, their basic 
instrument flying skills may diminish over time due to lack of use. 
 The purpose of this study was to gain an assessment of professional 
pilots’ basic instrument skills.  The study used both qualitative and quantitative 
measures to accomplish this task. 
 The hypothesis for this study was that with the advent of advanced 
aircraft, a pilot’s basic instrument flying skills will diminish over time, and will no 
longer be at the level required when they received their ATP license.  The two 
research questions were to what extent degradation in basic instrument pilot 
skills occurs, and can this degradation be statistically proven? 
 The study used two groups of pilots (wide-body and narrow body) flying 
five basic instrument maneuvers.  The maneuvers were flown without the use of 
any automation.  Each maneuver was flown 30 times.  Statistical analysis was 
conducted on the pilots groups looking for significant differences between 
groups.   
 x  
In addition to the quantitative portion of the study, the pilots were surveyed 
to gauge their individual perceptions of their instrument skill level.  The survey 
results were compared and correlated to the data from the maneuvers flown by 
the pilots. 
 When analyzed, using a t-test, all of the maneuvers showed a significant 
degradation below what is required for Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certification.  
In each case the mean maneuver grade was close to the basic instrument 
certification standard as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  
There was no statistical significance between different groups of pilots that 
participated in the study. 
 The survey portion of the study revealed that most professional pilots 
agree that their basic instrument skills have declined over time.  However the 
pilots in the study also believed that they could still fly the airplane by reference 
to raw data with a high degree of skill.  Maneuver grades and survey responses 
indicate that the pilots overestimated their basic instrument skills. 
 This study did not seek to investigate professional pilot’s overall flying 
skills which remain both safe and highly competent.  It only intended to 
investigate a small segment of overall piloting skills.  By increasing a pilot’s basic 
instrument skills, overall flying skills can be enhanced as well as the ability to 
cope with instrumentation failures that degrade the fidelity of the modern glass 
aircraft.  The problem of decreased instrument skills will continue into the future 
as more older-generation aircraft are retired.  Additional training and practice 
should be sufficient to retain these skills. 
 





DEDRADATON OF PILOTING SKILLS 
Introduction 
With the advent of advanced, highly-automated cockpits found in modern 
jet transport category aircraft, most of the tedious work of flying the aircraft solely 
by reference to raw data information from the airplane’s instruments is becoming 
a thing of the past.  In fact, many of the airlines now suggest that pilots not hand 
fly the aircraft with the automation turned off (United, 2006).  In years past, with 
older style aircraft, commercial pilots were required to do a majority of instrument 
flying by reference to raw data instrumentation.  Although flight directors were 
installed on these aircraft, they were seldom used and often unreliable.  The net 
result of this type of flying produced highly competent instrument pilots.  With the 
increased use of automation, basic instrument skills flight may be declining.  It is 
the purpose of this study to determine if the average jet transport pilot’s basic 
instrument flying skills have diminished as a function of the time spent flying 
technologically advanced aircraft.  Research on adult literacy skills does show a 
decline over periods of non-use (Wagner, 1995). 
Problem 
The piloting style of highly automated jet transport category aircraft may 
cause a commercial airline pilots’ basic instrument flying skills to diminish over 
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time.  In fact, a recent research study asked pilots to evaluate their own 
instrument skills (Advanced Aircraft Technology Safety Survey Report, 1998).  A 
majority of pilots responded that they believed their skills have diminished. In the 
survey 85% of respondents stated that they preferred to hand-fly part of every 
trip to retain their pilots skills.  In addition, 43% pilots considered that their 
manual flying skills had declined since they started flying advanced technology 
aircraft.  Most major airlines encourage the use of automation thus adding to the 
problem of possible skill degradation (United Airlines, 2006).   
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to gain professional pilots’ self assessment 
of their basic instrument flying skills.  In addition, the study attempted to quantify 
if a statistically significant degradation of a professional pilot’s instrument flying 
skills occurs over time while flying highly automated aircraft. 
Significance 
Certain failures in highly automated aircraft can cause complete loss of 
the auto-throttles, flight director, and moving map display, thus forcing the pilots 
to revert to their basic instrument flying skills.  If a significant decline in basic 
instrument flying skills is observed as a function of time spent flying 
technologically advanced aircraft, then a potential safety risk exists.  If any 
degradation of skills can be empirically documented and proven, then the airlines 
can use this study to develop specific training programs and guidelines to 
improve basic instrument flying skills.  In addition, guidance can be derived and 
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given to professional flight crews on how to maintain their instrument skills during 
regular line operations. 
Hypothesis 
With the advent of advanced aircraft with modern auto-throttles, flight 
director, and FMC/map, a pilot’s basic instrument flying skills will diminish over 
time and will no longer be at the level required when they received their ATP 
license.  The null hypothesis is that even after flying advanced aircraft, 
professional pilots still met the minimum skills as defined by the FAA to pass an 
ATP check. 
Research Questions 
1. Do basic instrument piloting skills decline in pilots of advanced modern jet 
transport aircraft? 
2. If basic instrument piloting skills decline in pilots of advanced modern jet 
transport aircraft, then does the decline depend upon time spent flying 
technologically advanced aircraft? 
3. Does a professional pilot’s perception of their instrument skills reflect their 
actual skill level? 
4. Can this degradation be statistically proven by comparing these pilots 
against the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) standard for 
professional pilots (Airline Transport Pilot – ATP – standard).  
Framework 
This study was a mixed methodology study focusing on two aspects of 
basic instrument flying.  First a qualitative survey was given to pilots to gauge 
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their perception of their own instrument skills.  The second part of the study 
required the use of first look data (data from maneuvers flown without pre-
briefing or practice) from participating airlines and was quantitative in nature.  
Each pilot of the flight crew flew five basic instrument maneuvers (in the 
simulator) without any prior practice or briefing.  The captain and first officer each 
started with a different maneuver (starting maneuver was based on the day of the 
week).  The maneuvers were evaluated in accordance with standard airline 
industry grading criteria and were represented as a numerical rating.  The data 
was completely de-identified and the maneuvers were non-jeopardy to the flight 
crew.  The independent variable for the quantitative part of the study was the 
type of aircraft that pilots were flying, and the dependent variable was their basic 
instrument skill level.  Each maneuver was flown 30 times by each of the 
following categories of pilots: 
a. Pilots of long-haul wide-body aircraft (B777, B747-400 A330, A340). 
b. Pilot of narrow-body short haul aircraft (B737-300, A320, B757) 
The two pilot groups were each chosen due to the fact that they should 
show significantly different results.  Narrow body pilots have a greater frequency 
of takeoffs and landings than those of wide-body aircraft.  This frequency may 
add to a pilot flying proficiency.  In addition, most wide-body aircraft rely heavily 
on automation due to the long duration of their flights.  The study took both type 
of aircraft and frequency of flying into account. 
There were 30 total pilots from a variety of backgrounds in the study.  The 
number of pilots was chosen in order to gain a statistically significant sample 
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approximating the skill level of the general professional pilot population.  Each 
pilot group was compared using an independent samples t-test against the FAA 
proficiency standard with specific emphasis placed on the comparison between 
narrow-body and wide-body aircraft.  This was done in an attempt to prove that 
there is a statistical difference between these pilots.  Post hoc tests were 
performed on the different maneuvers sets to determine if the complexity of the 
maneuver affected the pilot’s ability to successfully fly them.  If the study 
hypothesis is correct the pilots of the modern aircraft should show a significant 
statistical difference as compared to the standard pilot performance as defined 
by the FAA.  A summary of perceived instrument skills in each category was 
compared to the actual first look data results to see if there was any correlation 
between perceived piloting skills and actual performance. 
Assumptions 
1. Each participant was a qualified FAR pt 121 jet transport pilot employed 
by a US carrier (passenger or cargo). 
2. Each participant has spent at least one year in the specific seat and type 
of aircraft.  It is assumed that after one year of experience on a particular 
aircraft, that the pilot will be both comfortable and accustomed to flying 
that particular aircraft (the aircraft will not be “new” to them). 
3. Each pilot was current and qualified in the respective aircraft. 
4. Each pilot was considered a line pilot. 
5. The pilots had no prior knowledge or practice of the maneuver that was 
flown and was given no opportunity to practice it beforehand.   
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6. Each pilot was assumed to fly to the best of their ability during the 
maneuver. 
7. Each Check Airman rated the maneuvers on a consistent basis after 
receiving specific rater reliability training. 
Limits 
1. The study could be subject to inter-rater reliability errors of the individual 
instructors who evaluated the maneuvers.   
2. The study did account for pilots who fly additional aircraft outside of their 
respective company which in many cases would be traditional style 
aircraft.  The study asked in the survey if the pilot is flying outside of 
his/her professional employment.  
3. This study was not designed to specify what, if any, additional training 
would be required to maintain these instrument flying skills (that will be a 
follow on study).  The study recorded how long it has been since a pilot 
has flown in a professional capacity using “raw data”, and this in turn may 
lead to some insight as to how long these skills remain active. 
4. The study tested only five maneuvers to determine the level of piloting 
skills and is only representative of a pilot’s basic instrument skills, and not 
their overall piloting skills.  
5. This study is applicable to jet transport pilots of US carriers only.   
6. The study does not account for the fact that most of the pilots of widebody 
glass aircraft spent many years flying traditional aircraft, and conversely 
the junior first officers of narrow body aircraft may have mainly flown 
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advanced aircraft.  Some studies do indicate that skills learned and 
extensively practiced will be maintained and recalled at a higher rate than 
those skills briefly learned and utilized.   (Argote, 1998).   
Literature Review 
A literature review was conducted of pertinent articles related to this study.  
Although there were no direct articles on this particular problem, there were 
many articles concerning professional flight crews and automation.  The review 
begins with a broad overview of learning theory especially related to skill 
acquisition, retention, and declination.  In addition to reviewing only automation 
related issues, skill retention issues in the other fields were reviewed.  Finally, an 
anecdotal study on the reliance on GPS was reviewed to add some additional 
perspective to the problem of negative learning transfer with related system 
reliance problems.  The automation articles were from a wide range of 
government and private bodies that are considered experts in the field of 
automation. 
Learning a Complex Skill 
In the study, Knowledge Structures and the Acquisition of a Complex Skill, 
the researchers examined the viability of knowledge structures as an 
operationalization of learning in the context of a task that required a high degree 
of skill (Day, 2001).  During a period of three days, 86 men participated in nine 
training sessions on learning to play a complex video game.  After a four day 
non-practice period, the participants completed tests of skill retention and skill 
transfer.  The findings of the study indicated that the similarity of trainees’ 
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knowledge structures to an expert structure correlated with skill acquisition and 
was predictive of skill retention and skill transfer (Day, 2001).  In addition, 
knowledge structures mediated the relationship between general cognitive ability 
and skill based performance. 
Knowledge structures are based on the premise that people organize 
information into patterns that reflect the relationships that exist between concepts 
and the features that define them (Johnson-Laird, 1983).  These structures 
represent the organization of knowledge.  Declarative knowledge reflects the 
amount of knowledge or facts that are learned.  Memory organization enables 
individuals with a means for organizing and retrieving information for long term 
storage.  The study used a technique called structural assessment (SA) to 
measure knowledge structures (Johnson-Laird, 1983).  In a training context, 
knowledge structures reflect the degree to which trainees have organized and 
comprehended the content of training.  SA can be used to identify knowledge 
structures that differentiate between experts and novices. 
The study (Knowledge Structures) expected to find that the accuracy of 
trainees’ knowledge structures to have a positive correlation with skill acquisition, 
retention, and transfer (Day, 2001).  As individuals gain knowledge of a concept 
or task, their knowledge structures converge toward a true representation of that 
task.  The researchers in the study assumed that an expert’s organization and 
comprehension of a domain of knowledge are a close approximation of the true 
representation of that domain, and that this expert structure can be considered 
an indicator of skill development. 
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The results of the study showed that trainees whose knowledge structures 
were more similar to an expert structure performed substantially better on 
mastering the video game.  General cognitive ability was correlated with the 
accuracy of trainees’ knowledge structures, and had a strong relationship with a 
mechanically combined referent structure (CM) (expert memory organization).  
CM was related to skill acquisition.  The structure of the highly skilled trainee 
reflected functional similarities (to an expert), whereas the structure of the poorly 
skilled trainee reflected superficial similarities (Day, 2001).  Finally, the study 
found that trainees with a higher cognitive ability have knowledge structures that 
are more similar to an expert in nature (Day, 2001). 
Learning Degradation 
Argote (1990) examined the persistence and transfer of learning using 
production rates and transfer of knowledge of producing Liberty War ships 
(during World War II).  During a review of the most prevalent research, the study 
found that little evidence about the extent to which learning persists (Argote, 
1990).  The study also concurred with the fact that the time required to perform a 
task declined at a decreasing rate as experience with the task increased.  
However, previous studies also found that if practicing of a task was interrupted; 
forgetting occurs (Ebbinghaus 1885).  While interference from other tasks causes 
forgetting, forgetting occurs when performance is delayed even if there is no 
interference (Anderson 1985).  When performance is resumed, it is typically 
inferior to when it was interrupted (Kolers, 1976).  The study found that the 
“conventional measure of learning, cumulative output, significantly overstates the 
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persistence of learning” (Argote, 1990 page 145).  Results from the study 
indicated a rapid rate of learning depreciation, in some cases as much as 97% 
over a one year period.  It must be noted that all data for the study was gathered 
from shipyards in the 1940s.   
The opportunity for pilots to practice and maintain their skills has 
decreased significantly over time (Advanced Aircraft Technology Safety Survey 
Report, 1998).  Airline polices, advanced automation, and increased long haul 
flying has all added to this decreased opportunity to manually fly the airplane.  To 
combat this problem, some airlines have added simulator sessions to allow pilots 
to practice hand flying skills.  A recent survey of pilot perceptions indicated that 
85% of respondents prefer to hand-fly part of every trip to retain their skills. A 
statistically significant difference was noted between the responses of captains 
and first officers, with first officers more likely to prefer to “hand-fly part of every 
trip than captains.”  (Advanced Aircraft Technology Safety Survey Report, 1998, 
page 28).  “Forty-three per cent of pilots considered that their manual flying skills 
had declined since they started flying advanced technology aircraft.”  (Advanced 
Aircraft Technology Safety Survey Report, 1998, page 29).  Most pilots hand-fly 
their aircraft at some stages of each flight to maintain an acceptable skill level. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the main reasons for this are a pilot’s natural 
satisfaction in performing manual flying tasks, the requirement to perform manual 
flying exercises during simulator sessions (including recurrent training and 
license renewal) and the need to be able to manually fly the aircraft should the 
automated systems fail to function as expected.   
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It would appear that the attempts of both the pilots and their airlines have 
not succeeded in maintaining a perceived level of manual skills. Of concern are 
pilots who continue to manually control an aircraft with a diminishing level of skill. 
This has been recognized by some airlines who have implemented 
supplementary simulator programs to compensate for a perceived loss of manual 
flying skills.  Some airlines have required pilots to demonstrate their manual 
flying skills during simulator exercises to fulfill the requirements set down by 
regulatory authorities (Advanced Aircraft technology Safety Survey Report, 
1998). These requirements (for example, manually flown instrument approaches 
or emergency descents) are often outdated and thus not appropriate for the 
current level of technology.  Further research is needed to determine how pilots 
can best maintain their manual flying skills, the reliability of autopilot systems, 
and the appropriateness of license renewal procedures.  The Bureau of Air 
Safety Investigation recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
(Australia) ensure that all recurrent and rating renewal simulator exercises are 
appropriate considering the level of automation fitted to the aircraft type. Such 
exercises should reflect the level of serviceability which the pilot may be 
expected to encounter during line operations. (Advanced Aircraft Technology 
Safety Survey Report, 1998)  
Stefanidis (2006) examined the proficiency of highly complex skills over a 
period of time if those skills are not used.  Specifically, the study found that 
laparoroscopic surgery skills declined by 40% in residents after 15 months of 
non-use.   The study developed a hypothesis that a complex laparoscopic skill 
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(suturing) acquired by novices using a proficiency-based curriculum would be 
better maintained with ongoing training compared with a control group. The 
study’s specific aims were also to measure long term retention by novice learners 
and to identify the time interval at which skill deterioration initially becomes 
detectable, so that maintenance training interventions can be appropriately timed 
during future curricula (Stefanidis, 2006).  To assess retention, both groups 
performed three repetitions of laparoscopic suturing at 2 weeks and at 1, 3, and 6 
months post training completion without any instruction. The ongoing training 
group continued training after the first three repetitions at each follow up interval 
(starting at the first month) until the proficiency level was achieved on two 
consecutive plus five additional attempts.  The study found that both groups had 
excellent retention at the six month period, but the ongoing training group 
retained a greater portion of their skill.  Maintenance training reduced the skill 
loss to that of half of the control group.  At 15 months, a similar group of 
surgeons demonstrated a 40% skill loss in spite of on the job training 
(unpublished data).  The study went on to state that notable differences between 
the groups were detected and that ongoing training enhances skill retention.  
Finally, the study found that despite excellent initial training, in the absence of 
routine clinical use, complex skills diminish. 
Another study on adult literacy skills titled Use it or Lose it, The Problem of 
Adult Literacy Skill Retention, published by the National Center for Adult Literacy, 
reported several key findings as they relate to skills retention.  The study found 
that adult literacy skill retention varied dramatically from adult to adult depending 
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on the individual learner, prior knowledge of the skill, and the type and duration of 
instruction (Wagner, 1995).  It also found that extensive retraining of a skill is 
necessary after regular practice of that skill ceased (Wagner, 1995). 
Automation Training 
 The Flight Safety Foundation published an article focusing on pilots 
transitioning to glass airplanes.  In the article, the author (Wiener, 1999) made 
many recommendations on how to successfully train pilots on the operation of 
advanced aircraft.  He suggested that there must only be one standard, and it 
must be taught and checked constantly.  He also recommended that flight 
management should formulate a policy on maintaining manual flying (hand flying) 
skills and convey this to the pilots (Wiener, 1999).  He also suggested that 
companies allow for the practice of non-automation-based problem solving skills.  
A similar study commissioned by the FAA reported similar findings. 
 As a result of a crash of an Airbus A300 in Nagoya Japan, the FAA 
chartered a human factors (HF) team to address automaton related issues.  They 
were concerned that incidents and accidents such as what happed in Nagoya 
appeared to highlight difficulties in flight crews interacting with increasing flight 
deck automation.  The HF team determined from its findings that vulnerabilities in 
flight crew management of automation and situation awareness exist.  Among 
their findings were the pilots understanding of the automations’ capabilities, 
limitations, modes, and operating principles and techniques (Abbott, 1992).  The 
team also found differing pilot decisions about whether to turn the automation on 
or off during non-normal situations.  In addition, the HF team made a specific 
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recommendation to the FAA, that it should require operators’ manuals and 
training programs to provide clear guidance on circumstances in which the 
autopilot should be engaged, disengaged, or used in a mode with greater or 
lesser authority.   
Automation and Communication / Decision Making 
 In the study Impact of Automation of Aircrew Communication and 
Decision-Making Performance, the researchers’ attempted to clarify the 
relationship between automation, crew communication, and effective decision 
making.  The study involved 48 pilots flying predetermined simulator missions in 
either automated or manual conditions.  The scenario was designed to require 
crewmembers to arrive at a collective decision based on information obtained 
about an evolving simulated disaster.  The study found that the introduction of 
automation was not associated with better performance (Bowers, 1995).  There 
were however, significant differences in the communications of crews flying in the 
automated versus manual conditions.  Harmful consequences as a result of 
automation have been hypothesized that include increased complacency and 
decreased vigilance (Wiener, 1987)  Results from the study indicated that 
communication rates measured in spoken works tended to decrease as the level 
of automation increased even though activity rates of piloting duties and problem 
solving remained equally high.  The introduction of automation did not appear to 
result in improved crew performance.  In fact, the data suggested a mild 
advantage for crews in traditional cockpits (Bowers, 1995).  Further data 
suggested that automation resulted in a slight reduction in workload; however, 
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this reduction was not associated with improved flight performance.  The crews in 
the automated flight condition displayed worse performance on a decision-
making task (Bowers, 1995).  This study along with others on this topic indicates 
that a consequence of automation is the redistribution of workload and alteration 
of the crew process. 
Automation Bias 
 A study titled Automation Bias:  Decision Making and Performance in 
High-Tech Cockpits sought to quantify the effects of automation over-reliance in 
modern cockpits.  This study pointed out the need for pilots to be able to fly the 
airplane when the automation does not function correctly.  Automated aid and 
decision support tools are becoming the norm in today’s’ modern jet aircraft.  
Automation is assuming increasing control of cognitive flights tasks, such as 
calculating fuel-efficient routes, navigating, or detecting and diagnosing system 
malfunctions and abnormalities (Mosier, 1998).  The term automation bias refers 
to omission and commission errors resulting from the use of automated cues as 
a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing (Mosier, 
1998).  Highly automated cockpits tend to change the way pilots perform tasks 
and make decisions.  Researchers have documented problems in the use of 
advanced automated systems, including mode misunderstanding, failures to 
understand automated behavior, confusion or lack of awareness concerning what 
automated systems are doing and why, and difficulty tracing the functioning or 
reasoning process of automated agent  (Billings, 1996;  Sarter and Woods, 
1993). 
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In traditional aircraft, crewmembers are trained and develop their skills 
assessment through the use of both system and environmental cues (cross 
checking of information).  In most situations, processing is facilitated by inter-
correlations among cues (Wickerns and Flach, 1998).  In the cross checking 
environment, which related to older technology aircraft, pilots often looked for 
many clues in determining if a problem existed.  Pilots know and look for patterns 
or combination of cues that are most ecologically valid, reliable, or relevant for 
diagnosing particular situations, and they are able to incorporate contextual 
information to formulate a workable action plan based on their assessment of 
these cues (Kaempf and Klein, 1994). 
When automated aids are introduced, the pattern of cue utilization is 
disrupted.  Automated aids present powerful and usually highly accurate cues.  In 
fact, computational system diagnostic capabilities are advertised as being more 
accurate than pilots.  This leads to the overall attitude that the automated cues 
are not just another cue, but the most powerful and important cue.  These 
automated decision aids feeds into the general human tendency to travel the 
road of least cognitive effort.  Typically people try to engage in the least amount 
of cognitive work they can get away with (Fiske and Taylor, 1994).  People will 
generally utilize heuristics (cognitive shortcuts) to reduce effort and information 
load.   
It must be noted that automation does greatly aid in high-tech 
environments.  These systems are designed to decrease pilot workload by 
performing many cognitive tasks.  However indiscriminate use may have the 
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effect of increasing errors.  Inappropriate usage of automation in decision making 
may result in automation bias.   
The study described two types of automation errors; omission errors and 
commission errors.  Automation omission errors result when decision makers do 
not take appropriate action because they are not informed of an imminent 
problem or situation by automated aids (Moiser, 1998). 
China Airlines B747-SP, flying at 41,000 ft., lost power in its #4 
engine. The autopilot, which was set for pitch guidance and altitude 
hold, attempted to correct for the loss by holding the left wing down, 
masking the approaching loss of control of the airplane. The crew 
did not realize that there was a problem with the engine and took 
no action to deal with it. When the captain disengaged the autopilot, 
the airplane rolled to the right, yawed, then entered a steep descent 
in clouds. Extensive damage occurred during descent and recovery 
(NTSB Report AAR-86-03, in Billings, 1996). 
 
In a non-random sample of 166 events, the study found that the most 
likely phase of flight for omission errors to occur was the cruise phase.  
Automation commission errors are errors made when decision makers 
inappropriately follow automated information or directives (when other 
information in the environment contradicts or is inconsistent with the automated 
cue) (Moiser, 1998,). 
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Experimental evidence of automation-induced commission errors 
was provided by a full-mission simulation in the NASA Ames 
Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS; Mosier, Palmer, & 
Degani, 1992). During takeoff, crews received contradictory fire 
indications. An auto-sensing electronic checklist suggested that the 
crew shut down the #1 engine, which was supposedly on fire.   
 
Traditional engine parameters indicated that the #1 engine was 
recovering and that the #2 engine was actually more severely 
damaged. Seventy-five percent of the crews in the auto-sensing 
condition incorrectly shut down the #1 engine, whereas only 25% 
with the traditional paper checklist did likewise (Moiser, 1998). 
 
The use of automated cues as a shortcut in decision making may result in 
omission or commission errors.  Participants in this study were 25 commercial 
glass-cockpit pilots (i.e., pilots of automated aircraft, including Boeing 737-
300,757,747,747-400, MD-11). The average age of the pilots was 47, mean total 
flight experience was 12,370 hr, and the average career flying time was 23 years 
(Moiser, 1998).   
The participants were divided into two groups and given profiles to fly and 
their errors were recorded.  Descriptive analysis of the results of the study 
revealed overall omission rates for flight-related events of approximately 55%.  
The results of the study found that automation bias is a significant factor in pilot 
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interaction with automated aids.  The study also found that most pilots are not 
utilizing all of their available information when performing tasks and making 
decisions.  Experience and expertise, which might be predicted to make pilots 
more vigilant and less susceptible to automation bias, are related to a greater 
tendency to use only automated cues (Moiser, 1998) 
Automation Over Reliance 
The final portion of this literature review compares an anecdotal study of 
GPS usage vs. traditional navigation.  A study in 2005 by Casner demonstrated 
that pilots who navigate solely with a GPS and moving map displays have 
significantly less situational awareness than those pilots flying with a traditional 
map.  It was hypothesized that this drop in navigational awareness was due to 
the passive role assumed by pilots when using equipment that automates the 
navigational task.   
In the first study two groups of pilots were given the task to navigate over 
three predetermined points.  Pilot group one used only a current aviation map 
(sectional chart), whereas group 2 used only a GPS with a moving map display.  
Both pilot groups were again asked to navigate over the same circuit without the 
use of any navigational aids.  The results were measured in deviation from the 
circuit points in nautical miles.  Pilot group two performed significantly (P<.05) 
worse than pilot group one (Casner, 2005).  In fact two pilots in the GPS group 
could not even find their way to the starting point of the circuit.  The study then 
sought to find a way to keep pilots using GPS more aware of their surroundings.  
A third group of pilots was tasked to fly the same circuit as the first two groups.  
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Group three was permitted to use a GPS/moving map, however they were 
instructed to point out geological features along the circuit.  The study used the 
hypothesis of deep vs. shallow processing in hopes that pilot group 3 would 
perform better than pilot group 2 while flying the circuit a second time.  “In fact, 
performance of pilot group 3 was significantly better than group 2 during the 
second circuit (1.53 mean deviation vs. 4.92).”  (Casner, 2005 page 8).  The 
study concluded that the more pilot is active in a navigation task, the greater their 
navigational awareness.   
This literature review sought to give a broad overview of the related issues 
involving professional pilot instrument skill degradation.  The review touched on 
learning and retention theory as well as automation related issues.  It also 
discussed similar issues in related fields.  
 






 With the widespread use of highly automated jet aircraft, will a 
professional pilot’s basic instrument skills deteriorate over time?  Twenty-five 
years ago, the only glass aircraft in production was the Boeing 767/757.  At that 
time, pilots were required to do a majority of instrument flying by reference to raw 
data instrumentation.  Today, however, a majority of US airlines fly highly 
automated glass aircraft.  The tedious work of flying the aircraft solely by 
reference to raw data is becoming a thing of the past.  It was the purpose of this 
study to determine if pilots are losing their basic instrument flying skills.  In this 
chapter, the study population, sample, and design are discussed in detail. 
Population 
 The population for this study was professional pilots of FAR 121 
commercial carriers.  More specifically, the study focused on pilots of major 
and/or global (in terms of revenue) US airlines.  The aircraft that these pilots 
operate are termed transport category by the FAA.  Furthermore, the study 
focused on the pilots of scheduled passenger airlines. 
Sample 
 The study used data from airline pilots employed by US carriers during 
their recurrent training cycle.  Each subject flew all five of the basic maneuvers.  
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Thirty pilots participated in the study.  All of the subjects were active pilots 
employed by a major US air carrier (the carriers are not identified).  Each pilot 
was either a Captain or First Officer and had flown their particular aircraft for at 
least one year.   The average experience level was 7.1 years with a range from 
2-16 years.  There were 17 Captains and 13 First Officers, in addition, there were 
18 narrow-body and 12 wide-body pilots.  Pilots were also separated by the type 
of aircraft that they were assigned to, either wide-body (B747, B777, DC-10) or 
narrow-body (B737, A320, MD-80).  The pilots were separated in order to 
determine if there were any statistical differences between these groups.   
Study Design 
 This study utilized a mixed methodology study focusing on two aspects of 
basic instrument flying.  First a qualitative survey was given to pilots to gauge 
their perception of their own instrument skills.  The second part of the study 
required the use of first look data (data gained from pilot flying a maneuver 
without any warning or pre-briefing) from participating airlines and was 
quantitative in nature.  The quantitative portion of the study was a quasi-
experimental design with no formal control group.  The first look data was 
obtained from a maneuver set comprised of: a takeoff, ILS approach, holding, 
missed approach, and an engine failure at V1.  These maneuvers were flown 
without the use of auto-throttles, a flight director, or the FMC/map.  They were 
flown solely be reference to raw data (heading, airspeed, attitude, and vertical 
speed instruments only).  The first maneuver flown first was based on the day of 
the week. 
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Data Collection Methods/Procedures 
 Data collection for this study was focused on two parts.  The qualitative 
portion was completed via survey, and the quantitative portion was done by a 
check pilot.  The survey consisted of 13 multiple choice questions regarding the 
individual pilot’s perception of their own instrument skills.   Questions focused on 
how much basic instrument flying a pilot does on a regular basis, any flying 
outside of their professional employment, and their assessment of their 
instrument skills overall that specifically related to raw data flying.  The only 
identification on this survey for was the aircraft, date, and seat position. 
 For the maneuvers, the study used the airline’s check pilots who certify 
maneuvers for the FAA during recurrent training.  The check pilots (check 
airmen) rated each maneuver based upon the observed performance of the pilot.  
The rating scale was as follows: 
Table 1.  Grading Scale 
5 The pilot remained well within airline standards and 
performance was exemplary.   
4 The pilot remained within airline standards.  Pilot flew to ATP 
instrument standards 
3 The pilot committed minor deviations from airline standards 
that were promptly corrected. Basic instrument level. 




1 The pilot committed major deviations from airline standards 
that were not promptly corrected and/or were unsafe; or was 
unable to perform the maneuver/task without assistance.  
Crash or loss of aircraft control. 
 
On the data collection form, the aircraft type, date, and seat position was 
recorded only in order to match the pilot groups’ objective performance with their 
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subjective survey.  In addition, a question asked how much experience the pilots 
had flying in their particular aircraft (at least one year to be included in the study). 
Instrument Reliability and Validity 
 In order to ensure the success and content validity of the survey, it was 
evaluated by a panel of five experts to include; industry, union, and associated 
collegiate experts.  The experts reviewed the survey for both content and 
structure. 
 The instrument for the maneuvers rating was a certified check airman.  
These pilots are certified by the FAA to evaluate maneuvers during recurrent 
training.  They must attain a certain level of knowledge and experience before 
the FAA certifies them.  In addition, these pilots must pass a practical exam 
administered by the FAA in order to be certified to examine maneuvers.  In order 
to gain an accurate maneuver rating, each check airman completed a rater 
reliability training (RRT).   The check airman completed this requirement by 
reviewing a detailed instruction sheet on how the maneuvers were to be scored, 
examples of valid ratings, and examples of both correct and incorrect scoring.  In 
addition a specific maneuver deviation sheet was included in each 
survey/maneuvers packet to further aid the check airman in scoring the 
maneuver.   
Proposed Data Analysis 
 The survey portion of the study attempted to correlate the pilot’s 
perceptions and attitudes towards their actual performance (in the pilot groups 
and not as individuals). 
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 The maneuver scores were recorded and set in tables according to what 
group the pilot fell into.  A descriptive analysis using SPSS was conducted on the 
maneuver data.  In addition a series of independent t-tests were conducted 
comparing the two pilot groups for each maneuver.  The alpha level for the entire 
study was .05. 
Protection of Human Subjects 
 Pilots who participated in this study did so at no jeopardy to themselves in 
regards to their employment status at their respective airline.  Participation in the 
study did not count towards successfully completing the required recurrent 
training program..  The research study received assurances in writing from the 
respective airline before the study began and made this point clear to the pilots 
before the maneuvers were flown via a written consent form.  In addition, the 
participating airline gave its consent to be part of the study.  The pilot’s union was 
also notified of the study before data collection began.  Pilots’ survey responses 
and actual performance on the maneuvers was completely de-identified to 
protect both the pilots and their respective company.  When the data material 
was received, it was also completely stripped of the company identification.  This 
was done to prevent the results from any one company being compared to any 
other company or ending up published in the media.   
 






This study consisted of two parts a qualitative survey and a quantative 
analysis of basic instrument maneuvers flown in the simulator.  Maneuvers were 
graded against a set standard and compared to the FAA standard for Airline 
Transport Pilots.  The survey was conducted in order to gain a perspective into 
both how pilots at major airlines fly their aircraft during normal operations, and 
how they perceive their own flying skills.   
 The quantative analysis of the study involved observing pilots flying five 
basic instrument maneuvers in an FAA certified level D simulator.  The five 
maneuvers consisted of flying a takeoff, holding, ILS approach, missed 
approach, and a V1 cut.  The order of the maneuvers flown was based on the 
day of the week.  The maneuvers were rated by an FAA certified check airman 
and were graded 1-5 based on both a major airline’s and FAA standards.  
The type of aircraft the pilots flew was used in comparing both survey 
responses and maneuver performance.  This comparison was done due to the 
fact that these two pilot groups fly similar hours per month, but have vastly 
different frequencies (number of takeoffs and landings).  During a typical 20 hour 
trip a narrow body pilot may have as many as 12-15 takeoffs and landings, 
whereas a wide-body pilot would typically have only two.  Due to a higher 
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frequency of cycles, narrow-body pilots would perform better on the maneuvers 
than the wide-body pilots.   
The certification standard for all airline pilots is defined by the FAA in “ATP 
Practical Test Standards”.  Airline standards are generally in line but never less 
than the FAA standards.  The airline usually adds elements of time for deviations.  
When pilots are certified they must attain a standard of four as defined by Table 
1 above (page 23).  
Experience 
The first tests that were performed were a series of independent samples 
t-tests that compared self-reported experience with glass and non-glass aircraft 
along with the time since flying a non-glass aircraft as a function of type of 
aircraft flown.  Therefore, as previous stated, pilots were divided into either 
narrow-body or wide-body pilots.  The results of the t-tests are summarized in the 
table below.  
Table 2.  Experience Independent Samples t-test Results  
 Type of aircraft N Mean Std. 
Deviation 








3.42 .515   
Narrow-body 1
8 




1.92 1.084   
Narrow-body 1
8 
3.89 .323 2.591 .015 Years flying a glass aircraft 
Wide-body 1
2 
3.42 .669   
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The analysis revealed no significant difference in the years since flying a 
non-glass aircraft or in the years of experience flying a non-glass aircraft 
between narrow body and wide body pilots. However, the analysis indicated that 
Narrow-Body Pilots reported flying glass aircraft significantly longer than wide 
body pilots.    These results were further analyzed by the specific survey 
responses relating to pilot experience.  In the case of years since pilots had flown 
a non-glass aircraft there were very few pilots with recent experience.  A further 
examination of the survey question pertaining to experience with glass and non-
glass aircraft is presented below.   
The first experience survey question asked the pilot how long it had been 
since they had flown a non-glass aircraft.  The results are presented in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Years Since Flying a Non-glass Aircraft 
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A majority of these types of aircraft are being retired, and as a result, the 
survey indicated that over 56% of the pilots had either never flown a non-glass 
aircraft or it had been greater than 10 years since they had done so.  The next 
category 5-10 years held 36 % of the pilots with 3% each for less than two years 
and 2-5 years. 
The next survey question sought to quantify how much experience pilots 
had flying non-glass aircraft in airline operations.  The results are presented in 
figure 2. The scale was the same as for the first question.  The highest 
percentage of pilots (46%) indicated that they had two years or less flying non-
glass aircraft.  Pilots with 5-10 years experience were 23% of the sample, with 
20% having more than 10 years. 
 
Figure 2.  Non-glass Experience 
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 Pilots were then asked how may years they have been flying glass 
aircraft.  In this question, 73% of the pilots indicated that have 10 or more years 
flying these types of aircraft.  The next highest response was 5-10 years which 
accounted for 23% of the responses.  There were no pilots in the survey that 
indicated that they had two years or less flying glass aircraft. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Experience Flying Glass Aircraft 
Self Assessment 
The next section of the survey asked the pilots to asses their basic 
instrument skills.  Self assessment of flying skills as a function of aircraft type 
flown was also analyzed using a series independent samples t-tests.  The results 
are summarized in the table below.   
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Table 3. Self Assessment Independent Samples t-test Results  
 Type of aircraft N Mean Std. Dev. t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Narrow-body 18 1.28 .575 .585 .563 Hand flying below 10,000 
feet 
Wide-body 12 1.17 .389   
Narrow-body 18 1.56 .511 1.183 .247 Ability to fly maneuvers 
Wide-body 12 1.33 .492   
Narrow-body 18 2.06 .873 .774 .445 Skills have declined over 
time Wide-body 12 1.83 .577   
Narrow-body 18 2.11 .676 -.233 .817 Comfort flying raw rata 
Wide-body 12 2.17 .577   
Narrow-body 18 1.89 .758 .201 .842 Often practice raw data skills 
Wide-body 12 1.83 .718   
Narrow-body 18 2.00 .767 -.831 .413 Company encourages hand 
flying Wide-body 12 2.25 .866   
 
This test again revealed no significant difference between narrow body 
and wide body pilots in how they assessed their flying skill.   
 A further presentation of the survey results in graphic form is below. 
Survey questions were presented in the form of a statement to which the pilot 
responded in terms of; strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, and 
strongly disagree.   The first statement was “I usually hand fly the aircraft below 
10,000 feet.”  This statement was used in order to gain a perspective of how 
many pilots were actively flying the aircraft.  A great majority of aircraft 
maneuvering for both takeoff and landing occur below 10,000 feet.  Above this 
altitude most of the flying is in the cruise phase of flight with little maneuvering.  
As such, a pilot will retain a maximum amount of skill by routinely hand flying 
below this altitude.  The survey responses (Figure 4) indicated that 80% of the 
pilots strongly agreed that they usually hand flew the airplane below 10,000 feet.  
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In addition 16% of pilots somewhat agreed with the statement.  This indicates 
that a majority of pilots are hand flying the airplane in the maneuver intensive 
phases of flight.  It does not however indicate if they are using all of the aircraft’s 
advanced capabilities or flying by “raw data”. 
 
Figure 4.  Hand Flying 
The next statement asked pilots if they felt confident flying by raw data 
alone.   The results presented in Figure 5 indicated that pilots strongly agreed 
with this statement only 13% of the time with 60% stating that they somewhat 
agreed.  A total of 26% of the pilots somewhat disagreed with the statement.  
These responses indicate that a majority of pilots (86%) have some reservations 
about flying solely by raw data as indicated by the lack of “strongly agree” 
responses. 
 
 33  
 
Figure 5.  Raw Data 
In response to the statement “I could fly a takeoff, V1 cut, ILS, and a 
missed approach using only raw data,”  53% of pilots strongly agreed and 47% 
somewhat agreed (see figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  Ability to Fly Maneuvers 
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This indicates that the pilots believed that they could fly these maneuvers 
although not perfectly as indicated by the somewhat agree response.  There 
were no pilots who disagreed with the statement. 
Pilots were asked if they believe that their basic instrument skills have 
declined over time and the results are presented in figure 7.  Pilots agreed with 
this statement 26% of the time and somewhat agreed 53% of the time.  Only one 
pilot strongly disagreed with the statement, however 16% of the pilots somewhat 
disagreed with the statement.  This indicates that a majority of the pilots feel that 
their skills have somewhat diminished over time. 
 
Figure 7.  Skills Over Time 
Pilots were asked if they often practice their basic instrument skills.  The 
results are presented in figure 8. Of the pilots surveyed 33% strongly agreed and 
46% somewhat agreed.  Pilots somewhat disagreed with the statement 20% of 
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the time.  This statement indicates that a majority of pilots are doing at least 
some basic instrument flying. 
 
Figure 8.  Skills Practice 
The final survey statement asked whether pilots believed that their 
company encourages hand flying.  This statement saw a wide range of opinions 
and the results are presented in figure 9.  It is the author’s experience and and 
anecdotal opinion that companies who encourage hand flying generally have 
pilots who choose to hand fly more often.  Pilots agreed with this statement 20% 
of the time and somewhat agreed 57% of the time.  Pilots somewhat disagreed 









Figure 9.  Company Policy 
 An independent t-test was also performed on the maneuver rating as a 
function of aircraft type flown.  This was done to determine if any significant 
differences were noted between the two different pilot groups. The results are 
presented in Table 4.  
Table 4.  Mean Maneuver Ratings  




Narrow-body 18 3.2222 .94281 .158 .875 Takeoff Maneuver 
Wide-body 12 3.1667 .93744   
Narrow-body 18 3.0556 .72536 .204 .840 V1 Cut Maneuver 
Wide-body 12 3.0000 .73855   
Narrow-body 18 2.4444 .85559 .607 .549 Holding Maneuver 
Wide-body 12 2.2500 .86603   
 
 37  
 
Table 4. Continued 
Narrow-body 18 3.0556 .80237 .731 .471 ILS Maneuver 
Wide-body 12 2.8333 .83485   
Narrow-body 18 3.1667 .70711 1.157 .257 Missed Approach 
Wide-body 12 2.9167 .28868   
Narrow-body 18 2.9889 .46259 .900 .376 Mean of Maneuvers 
Wide-body 12 2.8333 .46580   
 
The analysis of the above data revealed no significant differences between wide-
body and narrow body pilots in their performance on the individual maneuvers or 
on a composite measure.  
 A final set of analyses were computed to test whether the maneuver 
ratings (ignoring aircraft type) were significantly different from the FAA standard 
of 4.  The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Maneuver Means 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Takeoff Maneuver 30 3.2000 .92476 .16884 
V1 Cut Maneuver 30 3.0333 .71840 .13116 
Holding Maneuver 30 2.3667 .85029 .15524 
ILD Maneuver 30 2.9667 .80872 .14765 
Missed Approach 30 3.0667 .58329 .10649 
 
A t-test reveled that the pilots in the study flew the five basic instrument 
maneuvers well below the FAA standards.  Significant t scores were noted for all 
maneuvers.  The t-test results are in Table 6. 
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Table 6.  One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 4 (FAA Standard)                                       
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
Lower Upper 
Takeoff Maneuver -4.738 29 .000 -.80000 -1.1453 -.4547 
V1 Cut Maneuver -7.370 29 .000 -.96667 -1.2349 -.6984 
Holding Maneuver -
10.521 
29 .000 -1.63333 -1.9508 -1.3158 
ILS Maneuver -6.998 29 .000 -1.03333 -1.3353 -.7314 
Missed Approach -8.764 29 .000 -.93333 -1.1511 -.7155 
 
 The results indicate that the study pilots flew the maneuvers closer to a 
basic instrument level instead of the FAA standard for Airline Transport Pilots 
(ATP).  The holding maneuver received the lowest grade 2.4 and the takeoff had 
the highest at 3.2.  Takeoffs are largely performed by reference to raw data 
instrumentation whereas holding is rarely if ever performed in such a manner. 
Correlations 
The responses to the survey were correlated with the maneuver ratings 
using a bivariate Pearson correlation with a significant correlation at .05 (2-
tailed).  All of the individual maneuvers means were analyzed in addition to the 
mean of all of the maneuvers.  The mean of all maneuvers should be the most 
stable of the analyzed means.  The only significant correlation existed between 
the holding maneuver and the survey question pertaining to company policy 
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regarding hand flying.  No other correlations existed.  The results are 
summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7.  Correlations 
    Takeoff V1 Cut  Holding  ILS  Missed  Mean 
Pearson Correlation -.030 -.039 -.114 -.137 -.214 -.168 
Sig. (2-tailed) .875 .840 .549 .471 .257 .376 
Type of 
aircraft 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation .163 .101 -.285 -.148 .086 -.038 




aircraft N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation .000 .227 .367* .317 -.016 .312 




N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation -.084 .206 -.053 .135 .066 .075 




N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation .118 .073 -.046 .274 .297 .224 




N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation -.353 .145 -.011 .123 .124 -.025 
Sig. (2-tailed) .056 .444 .955 .516 .513 .894 
Ability to fly 
maneuvers 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation .010 .065 .125 .333 .160 .227 




N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation .071 .142 -.095 .280 -.025 .130 




N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation -.010 .009 -.141 -.008 .103 -.030 




skills N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Pearson Correlation .251 .114 .399* -.048 .059 .281 




N 30 30 30 30 30 30 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
(2-tailed). 
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Data Summary 
 Analysis of the above data strongly suggests that pilots of advanced glass 
aircraft have experienced a significant decline in their basic instrument skills.  All 
of the maneuvers that were sampled were graded below the FAA certification 
standard for an Airline Transport Pilot.   In addition, the survey indicates that 
pilots are aware that their skills have declines, but still believe that they could 
successfully fly these maneuvers.  Lack of recent basic instrument flying 
experience is very high in flying glass aircraft which has lead to the decline in raw 
data skills.  Further discussion of these findings will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 







 The study found that professional pilots have a significant decline in their 
basic instrument skills.  The mean for each maneuver was compared to the FAA 
certification standards for both the Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate and the 
Instrument rating.  An ATP certificate is required to be a Captain for a major 
airline.  The certification standards are defined in the FAA’s Practical Test 
Standards.  All of the maneuvers were graded below the FAA certification 
standard for an ATP certificate (4) and in fact a majority of the maneuvers were 
rated at or below what is required for basic instrument certification (3).  The 
lowest rated maneuver was holding that was graded at 2.4.  This is well below 
the basic instrument certification grade (3).  The highest rated maneuver was the 
takeoff, graded at 3.2.  There were two maneuvers graded below three and three 
maneuvers graded above three. 
 The study also found through survey responses that the pilots who 
volunteered had an average of over seven years of experience flying their 
particular aircraft.   In addition, the study found that 73% of the pilots have over 
10 years of experience flying newer-generation glass aircraft.    The majority of 
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pilots, 47%, had two years or less flying a non-glass aircraft in commercial 
service. 
 The survey also found that 80% of the pilots surveyed agreed that their 
basic instrument skills have declined over time.  However, when asked if they 
could fly the basic instrument maneuvers with reference to raw data only, 100% 
of the pilots surveyed stated that they could.  In addition, 60% of the pilots 
agreed with the statement that they feel comfortable flying by reference to raw 
data only.   Pilots (80%) also indicated that they often practice their raw data 
skills. 
 Narrow-body and wide-body pilots were examined to see if there was any 
significance between maneuver means for these two groups.  There was no 
statistical difference between these two groups for the basic instrument 
maneuvers.   
Significance 
 The data clearly indicates that professional pilots have seen their basic 
instrument skills decline over time.  The study recognizes, however, that these 
same pilots are highly competent in the aircraft that they fly.  All of the pilots in 
the study continually meet the FAA certification standards for an ATP.  The study 
only observes one segment of instrument flying and thus only comments on this 
segment.  The study makes no assessment of professional pilots overall flying 
skills, which data suggests are at a very high level. 
 Certain technical failures in advanced glass aircraft can significantly 
degrade cockpit instrumentation.  These failures have occurred at the major 
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airline that participated in this study.  When these failures occur, pilots are 
required to use their basic instrument skills to safely land the airplane. 
 Pilots who are competent in basic instrument flying enhance their overall 
flying skills.  They can devote less attention to physically flying the airplane and 
more time managing their environment.  
 Although most pilots in the study agreed that their instrument skills have 
declined over time, their survey responses indicated that they felt they could still 
fly the basic instrument maneuvers.  The survey responses related to skills do 
not correlate with the actual maneuver grades.  This leads to the conclusion that 
pilots in the study believed that they could fly the maneuvers better than they 
actually could, leading to a false sense of confidence.   
Correlation 
 The maneuver grades generally fit with what the literature review revealed 
in other related studies.  Earlier studies indicated that skills, when not used, 
decline over time.  This was observed throughout the study in the mean 
maneuver grades.  Earlier studies also suggest that pilots who fly advanced 
glass aircraft see a general decline in their basic instrument skills as a result of 
using the instrumentation features of these aircraft.   
 Survey responses, although candid about skills declining over time, did 
not correlate with maneuver grades or responses to earlier surveys on the same 
subject.  It would seem as though the pilots who participated in the study 
believed that their skills had not declined as much as indicated by the maneuver 
grades.   
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 The suggestion by earlier studies that once a skill set was learned and 
practiced over a long period of time it would be retained longer than if the skills 
were practiced over a shorter period of time.  This was not seen in the wide-body 
/ narrow-body within groups comparison.  Pilots of the wide-body aircraft had 
more experience flying older-generation aircraft than the narrow-body pilots, but 
had very similar maneuver grades.  In fact there was no statistical difference 
between maneuver grades for these two groups.  This is most likely due to the 
fact that although narrow-body pilots fly similar monthly hours, they fly far more 
cycles than wide-body pilots.  This leads in a significant increase in maneuvering 
the aircraft and thus increased flying skills. 
Weaknesses 
 This study only observed five maneuvers.  The maneuvers were selected 
due to both their complexity and their relevance to typical line flying.  These 
maneuvers are trained and practiced by every pilot at least every nine months at 
the major airline that participated in the study.  Although these maneuvers are 
very common, they represent only a very small portion of the total flight 
maneuver envelope. 
 The study involved pilots at a major US airline.  This particular airline 
retired all of it’s non-glass aircraft in the fall of 2001.  As a result, most of the 
pilots in the study had not flown an older generation aircraft in the past 5-10 
years.  Other major US airlines still operate these types of aircraft although they 
too are in the process of removing them from active service.  The results might 
have been different if pilots from these other carriers were included in the study.  
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Legal barriers kept these other airlines from participating.  Since most major 
carriers are retiring older generation aircraft, the results that were seen in this 
study would likely apply to these other carrier at a later date due to their pilots 
becoming less familiar with basic instrument flying.  Although including pilots who 
are currently flying older generation aircraft would make a slightly better within 
groups analysis possible, it would be valid for this point in time only.  In the next 
five years, all major carriers will be flying newer generation aircraft hence these 
results would be valid for most other major airline in the future.  Since only one 
major airline participated in the study, the corporate culture, policies, procedures, 
and training program curriculum could have affected the results of the study.  The 
airline that participated has an advanced qualification program (AQP) for both 
initial and recurrently training cycles.  This training philosophy is targeted for crew 
training.  Pilots train and check together throughout all phases of training.   
Training consists of critiquing both how the pilots physically flew the aircraft and 
how they interacted with each other.  In this type of training program less time is 
spent on flying maneuvers than a traditional training program.  It must be noted 
however, that the certification standards are identical for both programs.  
Traditional training programs focus on flying specific maneuver sets with little or 
no input from the other pilot.   
 The survey attempted to garner both the pilots’ experience and the way 
that they flew their aircraft and generally had four responses to the questions.  In 
addition, the survey consisted of a total of 13 questions.  The responses in the 
survey pertaining to pilots’ assessment of their own skills did not correlate with 
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their actual performance.  If the survey were somewhat more robust with regards 
to response choices, a better picture of the pilots’ self assessment may have 
been able to be gained.  In addition, only three pilots indicated that they flew 
outside of their current professional employment.  As a result, very little was 
inferred from how these pilots were rated on the actual maneuvers. 
Future 
 There is little doubt that based on the results of the maneuvers, 
professional pilot’s basic instrument skills have declined over time.  This is linked 
to non-use of these skills in routine line flying.  In addition, newer-generation 
aircraft generally do not lend themselves to basic instrument flying, nor do most 
companies train or promote this type of flying.  Although it is rare, some failures 
in advanced glass aircraft can degrade the aircraft instrumentation to a state that 
would require a pilot to fly the aircraft based on raw data alone.  During the past 
10 years, two such failures have occurred at the airline that participated in the 
study.  In both cases the pilots landed safely.   
 The key to retaining these skills is practice.  Each professional pilot was 
highly competent in these skills at one time during their career.  A follow on study 
to determine how much practice is needed to retain these skills would be 
required.  In addition each airline would have to not only train and practice these 
skills, but encourage their use while line flying. 
 The results of this study will be forwarded to the airline that participated as 
well as the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) in hopes that airlines will realize that 
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basic instrument skills have declined in their pilots but also stress the need for 
training and practicing these maneuvers. 
 Airline safety can be improved by having pilots that are competent not only 
in flying the airplane with all of the advanced instrumentation working, but with 
degraded systems as well.  Pilots possessed these basic instrument skills at one 
time.  These skills can be increased through both training and practice thus 
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APPENDIX B 
Definitions 
.AC Advisory circular 
ACO Aircraft certification office 
AD Airworthiness directive 
AEG Aircraft Evaluation Group 
ALPA Airline Pilots Association 
APA Allied Pilots Association 
AQP Advanced Qualification Program 
ARAC Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee 
ASAP Aviation Safety/Accident Prevention 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
ATA Air Transport Association of America 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service 
ATP:  Airline Transport Pilot 
ATS Air Traffic Services 
AWO All weather operations 
BIS Basic Instrument Skills:  The ability to fly the aircraft solely by reference to 
the raw data without the use of auto-throttles, flight director, or map mode. 
CFIT Controlled flight into terrain 
CMO Certificate Management Office 
CNS Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance 
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CRM Crew resource management 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
FCOM Flightcrew operating manual 
FCU Flight control unit 
FMS Flight management system 
FOEB Flight Operations Evaluation Board 
FSB Flight Standardization Board 
FSDO Flight Standards District Office 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System 
HF Human factors 
HFStG Human factors steering group (JAA) 
HWG Harmonization working group 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IOE Initial Operational Experience 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
JAA Joint Aviation Authorities 
JAR Joint Aviation Requirements 
LNAV Lateral navigation 
LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training 
LOS Line Operational Simulations 
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Modern Aircraft/Glass Aircraft:  Aircraft that have advanced automation to 
include:  CAT III capability, auto-throttles, flight director, FMC, and CRT displays 
instead of actual instruments, the ability to LNAV and VNAV 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOTAM Notice to Airmen 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
Old Style Aircraft:  Aircraft that have standard cockpit instrumentation to include 
an attitude indicator and HIS.  These aircraft may have Lnav and CAT III 
capability but they do not have any CRT displays 
PDC Pre-departure clearance 
PFD Primary flight display 
PTS:  Practical Test Standards defined by the FAA pilot qualification. 
RNP Required Navigation Performance 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
STC Supplemental type certificate 
TAD Transport Airplane Directorate 
TC Type certificate 
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
VNAV Vertical navigation 
VOR Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Radio Range 
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